A paper by Mohammed S Elshimi with Raffaello Pantucci, Sarah Lain and Nadine L Salman entitled Understanding the Factors Contributing to Radicalization Among Central Asian Labor Migrants in Russia examines the factors contributing to radicalization and violent extremism among labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Russia.  The authors of the paper published on April 27 by the London-based Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, conducted 218 interviews (67 Uzbeks, 83 Kyrgyz and 68 Tajiks) with migrant labor workers, experts and local officials in thirteen cities across seven areas in Russia.  The focus of the paper is specifically on the extent to which migrant laborers based in Russia are at risk of recruitment.

This investigation looks through the lens of radicalization and violent extremism rather than the economics of migration or the sociological experience of being a labor migrant.  The aim of this research is to understand the broader political, economic, social, institutional and cultural conditions that might under certain circumstances generate violent extremism or leave individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging.

This report frames the research findings in terms of perceptions of the factors contributing to violent extremism rather than the causal factors leading to violent extremism.  From a methodological perspective, an ideal research project would have had access to violent extremists themselves, but for various practical and ethical reasons this was not possible.  Consequently, the research is about the milieu in which radicalization takes place.  Many respondents spoken to in this study had never encountered anyone who had been radicalized or recruited to violent extremism.  However, some interviewees did know someone directly who had been radicalized or recruited to violent extremism.  Data derived from the interviews with individuals who knew somebody closely who was radicalized is more reliable than others in the sample.  This report draws more heavily on their accounts.

The baseline for violent extremism and terrorism among Central Asians working in Russia is low, there is a low incidence of violent extremism in terms of terrorist attacks, plots and supply of foreign fighters among Central Asian labor migrants in Russia, according to the paper.  

The report notes that there is no clear evidence of a direct link between the marginalization of labor migrants and the ‘push’ factors that might drive individuals towards violent extremism. 

The paper says there is some fragmented but limited evidence that violent extremists are deliberately recruiting Central Asian labor migrants in Russia.  While the data conveyed who the recruiters were believed to be and what techniques they use to lure recruits in, overall there remains a lacuna in our understanding of these groups/organizations/networks in Russia and the broader region. A considerable number of interviewees spoke about the role of social media in the radicalization and recruitment process. It was seen as important in providing access to watch violent extremism videos, as well as receiving content through communications applications.  This greater exposure to violent-extremist content was also seen to be more prevalent in Russia than in Central Asian countries because smartphones are more affordable and access to the internet is better. 

According to the paper, the data identifies four types of people that participants believed to be more vulnerable and at-risk to violent extremism: 1) youth; 2) illegal migrants; 3) uneducated migrants; and 4) lonely individuals.

The report notes that there is no conclusive evidence for why labor migrants from Central Asia working in Russia would go to fight in a third country.  However, most people surveyed “believed that a monetary incentive (‘greed’) was the primary motive for joining violent-extremist groups.”  The second-most-cited incentive for migrants engaged in violent extremism was religion. 

So among the Tajik interviewees, for instance, “the majority of those interviewed (over two-thirds), eight of whom had some direct knowledge of recruitment, believed that money is an important incentive for those joining extremist groups.”

Meanwhile, one Kyrgyz male living in Moscow offers a particularly chauvinistic explanation for why “only Uzbeks go to Syria or Iraq.”  “Kyrgyz don’t respect them [those who go to fight], but among young Uzbeks they are some kind of hero,” he tells the RUSI researcher.

“The authors of this report are cautious against putting too much trust into the respondents’ views that economic hardship/poverty/material incentives drive radicalization,” Mohammed S. Elshimi writes in his closing analysis.