Mr. Marat Mamadshoev, editor-in-chief of IWPR Tajikistan, notes that Tajikistan lacks a transparent personnel policy for the appointment of civil servants.  In his opinion, it is particularly important to develop clear and verifiable criteria to assess the performance of civil servants.

Tajikistan, like other neighbors in the region, is a country with a high level of active state intervention in all aspects of public and private life.

State-owned enterprises still dominate industry, and the economy as a whole is dominated by state-owned companies, which have huge preferences over private business.  The authorities often use command-and-control methods and interfere even in the family and personal affairs of citizens.

The tax burden on business is very high. At the same time, for unknown reasons, a number of state-owned enterprises systematically fail to pay taxes, and officials are once again voicing initiatives to write off tax debts of state-owned enterprises, which were formed due to incompetent management, Mr. Mamadshoyev said in his article entitled “Personnel Policy and Criteria for Assessing the Performance of Civil Servants in Tajikistan

Almost all personnel appointments of the past few years in Tajikistan reportedly raise many questions; for example, the mysterious resignation of all heads of security agencies in Khatlon province, which took place in mid-January.

The president’s press service reported at the time that “the heads of the above-mentioned regional, zonal bodies, several cities and districts of Khatlon province allowed irresponsibility in the performance of their official duties”.

However, to this day there are no concrete explanations as to what the irresponsibility of these leaders manifested itself and how all of them were simultaneously involved in this process of “irresponsibility”.

The author notes that the composition of the current government was largely formed in 2020, although several leaders have been in office for more than 10 years.

Staff changes in Tajikistan’s government over the past three years are relatively rare.  But when they do occur, they almost always leave questions.

The latest appointments reportedly suggest that officials whose main virtue is loyalty are more likely to hold their posts. There are virtually no media personalities among the incumbent ministers. In the past few years, not a single Tajik minister has been interviewed by independent Tajik publications. Quarterly conferences have long ago become a formality.

It is equally important to define performance criteria for the state apparatus, as these indicators are now completely unclear. These criteria should be clear and verified.

It is possible to find clear and verifiable indicators for almost all spheres of activity of the state apparatus, the author says, noting that a comprehensive reform of personnel policy is needed

Some media often criticize the personnel policy pursued by the Tajik authorities. The criticism states that nepotism or nepotism, friendly association and personal loyalty are the main criteria in the selection of personnel. It can be added that at present Tajik civil servants are loyal not to the state as a system of institutions, but to specific leaders. Often, a new appointee gets rid of previous personnel and replaces them with his own. Therefore, the personal well-being of the leader becomes the main indicator of performance.

The following shortcomings of the Tajik civil service can be summarized briefly:

• There is no clear personnel policy, it is not known what criteria are used to select candidates for public positions and whether there is a competitive selection process;
• In fact, there is no system for training new personnel and there is no personnel reserve;
• There is no delegation of authority, no practice of collegial decision-making. Most decisions are made by a narrow circle and communicated to subordinates. Initiative is at least not encouraged, and often punished. Another negative result of such a policy is that local self-government does not develop;
• There is no institution of reputation, officials do not feel personal responsibility. Cases when officials resign for failures are extremely rare;
• There is no constant media support of their work. It is very important that the public understands what is happening in the corridors of power and what is (not) being done there.